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Abstract Self-driving cars hold out the promise of being safer than manually driven cars. Yet
they cannot be a 100 % safe. Collisions are sometimes unavoidable. So self-driving cars need to
be programmed for how they should respond to scenarios where collisions are highly likely or
unavoidable. The accident-scenarios self-driving cars might face have recently been likened to the
key examples and dilemmas associated with the trolley problem. In this article, we critically
examine this tempting analogy. We identify three important ways in which the ethics of accident-
algorithms for self-driving cars and the philosophy of the trolley problem differ from each other.
These concern: (i) the basic decision-making situation faced by those who decide how self-
driving cars should be programmed to deal with accidents; (ii) moral and legal responsibility; and
(iii) decision-making in the face of risks and uncertainty. In discussing these three areas of
disanalogy, we isolate and identify a number of basic issues and complexities that arise within
the ethics of the programming of self-driving cars.
Keywords Self-driving cars . The trolley problem . Decision-making .Moral and legal
responsibility . Risks and uncertainty
Self-driving cars hold out the promise of being much safer than our current manually driven cars.
This is one of the reasons why many are excited about the development and introduction of self-
driving cars. Yet, self-driving cars cannot be a 100 % safe. This is because they will drive with
high speed in the midst of unpredictable pedestrians, bicyclists, and human drivers (Goodall
2014a-b) So there is a need to think about how they should be programmed to react in different
scenarios in which accidents are highly likely or unavoidable. This raises important ethical
questions. For instance, should autonomous vehicles be programmed to always minimize the
number of deaths? Or should they perhaps be programmed to save their passengers at all costs?
What moral principles should serve as the basis for these Baccident-algorithms^? Philosophers are
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slowly but surely beginning to think about this general issue, and it is already being discussed in
the media and in various different online forums.
Some philosophers have recently likened accident-management in autonomous vehicles to
the so-called trolley problem. Several journalists and opinion piece writers have also done so.1
The trolley problem is the much-discussed set of philosophical thought experiments in which
there is a runaway trolley and the only way to save five people on the tracks is to sacrifice one
person. (Thomson 1985) Different versions of these trolley cases vary with respect to how the
one will need to be sacrificed in order for the five to be saved. It is the most basic versions that
are said to foreshadow the topic of how to program autonomous vehicles.
For example, Patrick Lin writes:
One of themost iconic thought-experiments in ethics is the trolley problem. .. and this is one
that may now occur in the real world, if autonomous vehicles come to be. (Lin 2015, 78)
Similarly, when discussing another kind of autonomous vehicles (viz. driverless trains),
Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen write:
...could trolley cases be one of the first frontiers for artificial morality? Driverless systems
put machines in the position of making split-second decisions that could have life or death
implications. As the complexity [of the traffic] increases, the likelihood of dilemmas that
are similar to the basic trolley case also goes up. (Wallach and Allen 2009, 14)
Nor are philosophers alone in making this comparison. Economists and psychologists Jean-
François Bonnefon, Azim Shariff, and Iyad Rahwan write:
situations of unavoidable harms, as illustrated in [our examples of crashes with self-
driving cars], bear a striking resemblance with the flagship dilemmas of experimental
ethics – that is, the so-called ‘trolley problem’. (Bonnefon et al. 2015, 3)
According to these various writers, then, the problem of how to program self-driving cars
and other autonomous vehicles for different accident-scenarios is very similar to the trolley
problem. If true, this would have important implications concerning how to best approach the
ethics of self-driving cars. It suggests that when we approach the ethics of accident-algorithms
for autonomous vehicles, the ever growing literature on the trolley problem is a good, if not the
best, place to start. Moreover, it suggests that that literature treats the key issues we need to
focus on when we try to formulate an ethical framework for sound moral reasoning about how
autonomous vehicles should be programmed to deal with risky situations and unavoidable
accidents.2
In this paper, we critically examine this tempting analogy between the trolley problem and
the problem of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars. We do so with a skeptical eye.
Specifically, we argue that there are three very important respects in which these two topics
are not analogous. We think, therefore, that it is important to resist the temptation to draw a
very strong analogy between the ethics of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars and the
philosophy of the trolley problem.
1 E.g. Achenbach 2015; Doctorow 2015; Lin 2013; Windsor 2015; Worstall 2014
2 Reasoning in just that way, Bonnefon et al. (2015) propose that the methods developed within experimental
ethics to investigate judgments about the trolley problem should be used to investigate ordinary people’s
intuitions about accident-algorithms for self-driving cars. Bonnefon et al. further think that once these intuitions
have been carefully surveyed and systematically analyzed, they should then serve as starting points for normative
discussions of how self-driving cars ought to be programmed.
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Why is this an important topic to investigate? Firstly, the issue of how to program self-
driving cars is a pressing ethical issue, given the rapid development of this technology and the
serious risks involved. We therefore need to identify the best sources of ethical theory that
could help us to deal with this part of moral practice. At this stage, we are only beginning to
grapple with this problem. So it is crucial to thoroughly investigate any initial Bleads^ we have
about where best to start as we open up the discussion of this general topic. The similarity
between accident-planning for self-driving cars and the trolley problem that some writers claim
to have identified is one such lead. That’s one reason why it is important to investigate whether
(or not) the literature on the trolley problem is indeed the best place to primarily turn to as we
approach this ethical issue. Secondly, in investigating how similar or dissimilar these two
topics are, we in effect isolate and identify a number of basic key issues that further work on
the ethics of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars needs to deal with. In conducting this
positive part of our inquiry, we investigate what types or categories of considerations are at
issue here. And we make it very clear that the problem of how to program autonomous
vehicles to respond to accident-scenarios is a highly complex ethical issue, under which there
are various sub-issues that on their own also exhibit a lot of complexity.
We proceed as follows. We first say a little more about why an ethical framework for risk-
management for autonomous vehicles needs to be developed (section 1). We then say more
about the trolley problem and the main issues discussed in the literature on the trolley problem
(section 2). After that, we explain the three main differences we see between the ethics of
accident-management in self-driving cars, on the one hand, and the trolley problem and
trolleyology, on the other hand (sections 3–5). To anticipate, these differences have to do with
(i) prospective planning by groups that takes large numbers of situational features into account
vs. imagined split-second decisions by individuals that abstract away all but a few features of
the situation directly at hand; (ii) taking seriously pressing issues of moral and legal respon-
sibility vs. setting such issues aside as irrelevant as a matter of stipulation; and (iii) reasoning
about probabilities, uncertainties and risk-management vs. intuitive judgments about what are
stipulated to be known and fully certain facts. Lastly, we end by briefly summarizing our main
conclusions (section 6).
1 Programming Self-Driving Cars for how to React in the Event of Accidents
As we noted above, even self-driving cars will inevitably sometimes crash. Noah Goodall
(2014a-b) and Patrick Lin (2015) convincingly argue for this claim, and in addition explain
why programming self-driving cars for crashes involves ethical choices. In explaining what’s
at issue, we here draw on Goodall’s and Lin’s work.
A self-driving car uses advanced sensor-technology to detect its surroundings and sophis-
ticated algorithms to subsequently predict the trajectory of nearby (moving) objects. Self-
driving cars can also use information technology to communicate with each other, thus
achieving better coordination among different vehicles on the road. However, since cars are
heavy and move with high speed, physics informs us that they have limited maneuverability,
and that they often cannot simply stop. Therefore, even if the car-to-car communication and
the sensors and algorithms are all functioning properly (and would be better than current
technology), self-driving cars will not always have sufficient time to avoid collisions with
objects that suddenly change direction. (Goodall 2014a) Self-driving cars will sometimes
collide with each other. But there are also other moving objects to worry about. Pedestrians,
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cyclists, and wildlife naturally come to mind here. (Lin 2015) However, we must also take into
account human-driven cars. Because, as is generally acknowledged by the experts, self-driving
cars will for a long period drive alongside human-driven cars (so-called Bmixed traffic^) (van
Loon and Martens 2015).
For these reasons, automated vehicles need to be programmed for how to respond to
situations where a collision is unavoidable; they need, as we might put it, to be programmed
for how to crash. At first blush, it might seem like a good idea to always transfer control to the
people in the car in any and all situations where accidents are likely or unavoidable. However,
human reaction-times are slow. It takes a relatively long time for us to switch from focusing on
one thing to focusing on another. So handing over control to the human passengers will often
not be a good option for the autonomous vehicle. Hence the car itself needs to be prepared, viz.
programmed, for how to handle crashes.
This has certain advantages. A self-driving car will not react in the panicky and disorga-
nized ways a human being is apt to react to accident-scenarios. Even in situations of
unavoidable collisions, the car’s technology enables significant choices and control-levels
regarding how to crash. Based on its sensor inputs and the other information it has access to,
the car can calculate the most likely consequences of different trajectories that involve different
combinations of braking and swerving.
Consider now the following scenario.3 A self-driving car with five passengers approaches a
conventional car (e.g. a heavy truck) that for some reason suddenly departs from its lane and
heads directly towards the self-driving car. In a split-second, the self-driving car senses the
trajectory and the likely weight of the oncoming truck. It calculates that a high-impact collision
is inevitable, which would kill the five passengers, unless the car swerves towards the
pavement on its right-hand side. There, unfortunately, an elderly pedestrian happens to be
walking, and he will die as a result if the self-driving car swerves to the right and hits him. This
is the sort of situation in which the human passengers of a self-driving car cannot take control
quickly enough. So the car itself needs to respond to the situation at hand. And in order for the
five passengers in the self-driving car to be saved, as they are likely to be if the head-on
collision with the heavy truck is avoided, the car here needs to make a maneuver that will most
likely kill one person.
It is evident that scenarios like this one involve significant ethical dilemmas. Among other
things, they raise questions about what the self-driving car’s pre-set priorities should be.
Should it here swerve to the sidewalk and save the greatest number, or should it rather protect
the innocent pedestrian and crash into the oncoming truck? In general, should the car be
programmed to always prioritize the safety of its passengers, or should it sometimes instead
prioritize other considerations, such as fairness or the overall good, impartially considered?
Crucially, unless the self-driving car is programmed to respond in determinate ways to morally
loaded situations like the one we just described, there is an unacceptable omission in its
readiness to deal with the realities and contingencies of actual traffic. (Goodall 2014a-b; Lin
2015) Not programming the car for how to respond to situations like this and others like it
3 Our illustration here is a Bmixed traffic^-case. Self-driving cars will inevitably sometimes collide with each
other, for example if one of them is malfunctioning. But the risks are even greater within mixed traffic involving
both self-driving cars and conventional cars, since human drivers and self-driving cars have a harder time
communicating with each other. (van Loon and Martens 2015) Still, self-driving cars need to be programmed for
how to handle collisions with both other self-driving cars and conventional cars (in addition to any other objects
that might suddenly appear in their paths). (Lin 2015) We discuss the ethics of compatibility-problems within
mixed traffic at greater length in (Nyholm and Smids in progress).
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amounts to knowingly relinquishing the important responsibility we have to try to control what
happens in traffic. It amounts to unjustifiably ignoring the moral duty to try to make sure that
things happen in good and justifiable ways. We should not do that. Hence the need for ethical
accident-algorithms.4
At first glance, the accident-scenario we just described above looks similar to the examples
most commonly discussed in relation to the trolley problem. But suppose that we probe a little
deeper beneath the immediate surface, and that we home in on the more substantial ethical
issues raised by the choice of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars. Are Lin, Wallach and
Allen, and Bonnefon et al. then still right that the choice of accident-algorithms for self-driving
cars is like a real world version of the trolley problem, as it is usually understood and discussed
in the literature?
2 BThe Trolley Problem^?
The easiest way to introduce the trolley problem is to start with the two most widely discussed
cases involved in these thought experiments. These are the cases the above-cited
writers have in mind when they compare the ethics of accident-algorithms for self-
driving cars to the trolley problem.
In the Bswitch^ case, a driverless trolley is heading towards five people who are stuck on
the tracks and who will be killed unless the trolley is redirected to a side track. You are
standing next to a switch. If you pull the switch, the trolley is redirected to a side-track and
diverted away from the five. The trouble is that on this side track, there is another person, and
this person will be killed if you pull the switch to redirect the train. Nevertheless, a very
common response to this case is that it is here permissible for you to save the five by
redirecting the train, thus killing the one as a result (Greene 2013).
In a different variation on this theme, the Bfootbridge^ case, saving the five requires
different means. In this case, you are located on a footbridge over the tracks. Also present
on the footbridge is a very large and heavy man. His body mass is substantial enough that it
would stop the trolley if he were pushed off the footbridge and onto the tracks. But this would
kill him. Is it morally permissible to push this man to his death, thereby saving the five by this
means? A very common response to this case is that it is not permissible. (Greene 2013) So in
this case saving the five by sacrificing the one seems wrong to most of us, whereas in the other
case, saving the five by sacrificing the one seems morally permissible.
Many people casually use the phrase Bthe trolley problem^ to refer to one or both of these
examples. But some influential philosophers use this phrase to mean something more distinct.
According to Judith Jarvis Thomson, for example, the basic trolley problem is to explain the
above-described asymmetry in our judgments. (Thomson 2008) That is, why is it permissible
in one case to save the five by sacrificing the one, whereas it is not permissible to save the five
by sacrificing the one in the other case? Others favor a wider interpretation of the trolley
problem, holding that this problem also arises in cases that don’t involve any trolleys at all.
4 The design of ethical decision-making software immediately presents two major challenges. First, what moral
principles should be employed to solve this sort of ethical dilemmas? Second, even if we were to reach
agreement, it turns out to be a formidable challenge to design a car capable of acting fully autonomously on
the basis of these moral principles (cf. Goodall 2014a). We will not go into this latter question, but will instead
here simply note that this is an important and pressing issue, which is studied in the field of machine morality or
robot ethics (e.g. Wallach and Allen 2009).
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According to Frances Kamm, the basic philosophical problem is this: why are certain people,
using certain methods, morally permitted to kill a smaller number of people to save a greater
number, whereas others, using other methods, are not morally permitted to kill the same
smaller number to save the same greater number of people? (Kamm 2015) For example, why
is it is not permissible for a medical doctor to save five patients in need to organ-transplants by
Bharvesting^ five organs from a perfectly healthy patient who just came into the hospital for a
routine check-up? This case doesn’t mention trolleys, but Kamm thinks it nevertheless falls
under the wide umbrella of the trolley problem.
These various thought-experiments have been used to investigate a number of different
normative issues. For example, they have been used to investigate the difference between: (i)
Bpositive^ and Bnegative^ duties, that is, duties to do certain things vs. duties to abstain from
certain things; (ii) killing and letting die; and (iii) consequentialism and non-consequentialism
in moral theory, that is, the difference between moral theories only concerned with promoting
the overall good vs. moral theories that also take other kinds of considerations into
account.(Foot 1967; Thomson 1985; Kamm 2015) And in recent years, they have also been
used to empirically investigate the psychology and neuroscience of different types of moral
judgments. (Greene 2013; Mikhail 2013).
We agree that trolley cases can certainly be useful in the discussion of these various topics.
But how helpful are these thought-experiments and the large literature based on them for the
topic of how self-driving cars ought to be programmed to respond to accident-scenarios where
dangerous collisions are highly likely or unavoidable? We will now argue that there are three
crucial areas of disanalogy that should lead us to resist the temptation to draw a strong analogy
between the trolley problem and the ethics of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars.
3 Two Very Different Decision-Making Situations
To explain the first noteworthy difference between the ethics of accident-algorithms for
autonomous vehicles and the trolley dilemmas we wish to bring attention to, we will start
by returning to the quote from Wallach and Allen in the introduction above. Specifically, we
would like to zoom in on the following part of that quote:
Driverless systems put machines in the position of making split-second decisions that
could have life or death implications.
It is tempting to put things like this if one wishes to quickly explain the ethical issues
involved in having driverless systems in traffic.5 But it is also somewhat misleading. Wallach
and Allen are surely right that there is some sense in which the driverless systems themselves
need to make Bsplit-second decisions^ when they are in traffic. And these can indeed have life
or death implications. However, strictly speaking, the morally most important decision-making
is made at an earlier stage. It is made at the planning stage when it is decided how the
autonomous vehicles are going to be programmed to respond to accident-scenarios. The
Bdecisions^ made by the self-driving cars implement these earlier decisions.
5 In a similar way, Lin writes that if Bmotor vehicles are to be truly autonomous and be able to operate
responsibly on our roads, they will need to replicate [. . .] the human decision-making process.^ (Lin 2015,
69). Cf. also Purves et al.’s remark that B[d]riverless cars [ . . .] would likely be required to make life and death
decisions in the course of operation.^ (Purves et al. 2015, 855)
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The morally relevant decisions are prospective decisions, or contingency-planning, on the part
of human beings. In contrast, in the trolley cases, a person is imagined to be in the situation as it is
happening. The person is forced right there and then to decide on the spot what to do: to turn the
trolley by pulling the switch (switch case) or push the large man off the bridge (footbridge case).
This is split-second decision-making. It is unlike the prospective decision-making, or contingen-
cy-planning, we need to engage in when we think about how autonomous cars should be
programmed to respond to different types of scenarios we think may arise.6 When it comes to
the morally relevant decision-making situations, there is more similarity between accident-
situations involving conventional cars and trolley-situations than between prospective program-
ming for accident-situations involving autonomous cars and trolley-situations. For example, a
driver of a conventional car might suddenly face a situation where she needs to decide, right there
and then, whether to swerve into one person in order to avoid driving into five people. That is
much closer to a trolley-situation than the situation faced by those who are creating contingency-
plans and accident-algorithms for self-driving cars is.7
Nor is it plausible to think of decision-making about how self-driving cars should be
programmed as being made by any single human being. That is what we imagine when we
consider the predicament of somebody facing a trolley situation. This does not carry over to
the case of self-driving cars. Rather, the decision-making about self-driving cars is more
realistically represented as being made by multiple stakeholders – for example, ordinary
citizens, lawyers, ethicists, engineers, risk-assessment experts, car-manufacturers, etc. These
stakeholders need to negotiate a mutually agreed-upon solution. And the agreed-upon solution
needs to be reached in light of various different interests and values that the different
stakeholders want to bring to bear on the decision.8
The situation faced by the person in the trolley case almost has the character of being made
behind a Bveil of ignorance,^ in John Rawls’ terms. (Rawls 1971) There is only a very limited
number of considerations that are allowed to be taken into account. The decision-maker is
permitted to know that there are five people on the tracks, and that the only way to
save them is to sacrifice one other person – either by redirecting the runaway trolley
towards the one (switch case) or by pushing a large person into the path of the trolley
(footbridge case). These are the only situational factors that are allowed into the decision-
making, as if this were a trial where the jury is only allowed to take into account an extremely
limited amount of evidence in their deliberations.
This is not the ethical decision-making situation that is faced by the multiple stakeholders
who together need to decide how to program self-driving cars to respond to different types of
accident-scenarios. They are not in a position where it makes sense to set aside most situational
6 As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, this difference in time-perspectives might render it plausible for
different moral principles to serve as the evaluation-criteria for the programming of self-driving cars and the
behavior of drivers in acute situations. For example, the aim of minimizing the statistically expected number of
deaths can seem more justifiable and apt in prospective decision-making about accident-algorithms for self-
driving cars than in retrospective evaluation of actual human responses to dramatic accident-scenarios. (Cf.
Hansson 2013, 74–80)
7 We owe this last observation to our colleague Auke Pols.
8 JasonMillar argues that the accident-algorithms of self-driving cars ought to be selected by the owner of the car.
(Millar 2014) This would mean that different cars could have different accident-algorithms. Two comments:
firstly, this would still require a mutual decision since the basic decision to give owners of self-driving cars the
right to choose their accident-algorithms would need to be agreed upon by the various different stakeholders
involved. Second, this seems undesirable since different accident-algorithms in different cars would complicate
coordination and compromise safety.
The Ethics of Accident-Algorithms for Self-Driving Cars 1281
and contextual factors, and only focus on a small set of features of the immediate situation.
Instead, they can bring any and all considerations they are able to think of as being
morally relevant to bear on their decisions about how to program the cars. They can do that and
should do so.
In sum, the basic features of these two different decision-making situations are radically
different. In one case, the morally relevant decision-making is made by multiple stakeholders,
who are making a prospective decision about how a certain kind of technology should be
programmed to respond to situations it might encounter. And there are no limits on what
considerations, or what numbers of considerations, might be brought to bear on this decision.
In the other case, the morally relevant decision-making is done by a single agent who is
responding to the immediate situation he or she is facing – and only a very limited number of
considerations are taken into account. That these two decision-making situations are so
radically different in their basic features in these respects is the first major disanalogy we
wish to highlight.9
4 A Second Disanalogy: the Importance of Moral and Legal Responsibility
In order to set up the second main observation we wish to make, we will start by again
returning to the following feature of the standard trolley cases. As just noted, we are asked to
abstract away all other aspects of the situations at hand except for the stipulation that either five
will die or one will die, where this depends on whether we (i) redirect the train away from the
five and towards the one by pulling a switch (switch case) or (ii) push the one down
from the bridge onto the tracks and into the line of the trolley (footbridge case). We
are supposed to bracket any and all other considerations that might possibly be ethically
relevant and consider what it would be permissible or right to do, taking only these features
of the cases into consideration.
This is a characteristic of the trolley cases that has been criticized. Consider Allen Wood’s
criticism. Wood notes that, when we set aside everything else than the above-described
considerations, there is Ban important range of considerations that are, or should be, and in
real life would be absolutely decisive in our moral thinking about these cases in the real world
is systematically abstracted out.^ (Wood 2011, 70) Explaining what he finds problematic about
this, Wood writes:
even if some choices [in real life] inevitably have the consequence that either one will
die or five will die, there is nearly always something wrong with looking at the choice
only in that way. (Wood 2011, 73, emphasis added)
What is Wood getting at?
What Wood is missing is, among other things, due concern with moral and legal respon-
sibility, viz. the question of who we can justifiably hold morally and legally responsible for
9 Jan Gogoll and Julian Mueller identify three further differences between these two decision-making situations
worth noting: (i) the much more static nature of standard trolley-situations as compared to the non-static
situations that self-driving cars will typically face; (ii) the possibility of updating and revising accident-
algorithms over time in self-driving cars, which contrasts with how trolley-situations are typically represented
as isolated events; (iii) the one-sided nature of the Bthreat^ in trolley-situations (the decision-maker is not
represented as being at risk) as opposed to how in typical traffic-situations, all parties are usually subject to
certain risks. (Gogoll and Müller 2016)
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what is going on. Commenting specifically on how trains and trolley cars are regulated in real
life, Wood writes:
Trains and trolley cars are either the responsibility of public agencies or private
companies that ought to be, and usually are, carefully regulated by the state with a view
to ensuring public safety and avoiding loss of life. (Wood 2011, 74)
Developing the legal side of the issue further, Wood continues:
...mere bystanders ought to be, and usually are, physically prevented from getting at the
switching points of a train or trolleys. They would be strictly forbidden by law from
meddling with such equipment for any reason, and be held criminally responsible for
any death or injury they cause through such meddling. (Wood 2011, 75)
Thus Wood thinks that trolley cases are too far removed from real life to be useful for moral
philosophy. One key reason is that in real life, we hold each other responsible for what we do
or fail to do. When it comes to things involving substantial risks – such as traffic – we cannot
discuss the ethical issues involved without taking issues of moral and legal responsibilities into
account. Since trolley cases ignore all such matters, Wood finds them irrelevant to the ethics of
the real world.
We think that Wood might be going too far in making this criticism of the philosophical and
psychological literature on the trolley problem. It is surely the case that sometimes examples that
might not be very true to real life can serve useful purposes in moral philosophy and in various
other fields of academic inquiry. But we think that the issue Wood brings up helps to highlight a
stark difference between the discussion of the trolley problem and the issue of how we ought to
program self-driving cars and other autonomous vehicles to respond to high-risk situations.
The point here is that when it comes to the real world issue of the introduction of self-
driving cars into real world traffic, we cannot do what those who discuss the trolley problem
do. We cannot stipulate away all considerations having to do with moral and legal responsi-
bility. We must instead treat the question of how self-driving cars ought to be pre-programmed
as partly being a matter of what people can be held morally and legally responsible for. (Cf.
Hevelke and Nida-Rümelin 2014) Specifically, we must treat it as a question of what those
who sell or use self-driving cars can be held responsible for and what the society that permits
them on its roads must assume responsibility for.
With the occurrence of serious crashes and collisions – especially if they involve fatalities
or serious injuries – people are disposed to want to find some person or persons who can be
held responsible, both morally and legally. This is an unavoidable aspect of human interaction.
It applies both to standard traffic, and traffic introducing self-driving cars. Suppose, for
example, there is a collision between an autonomous car and a conventional car, and though
nobody dies, people in both cars are seriously injured. This will surely not only be followed by
legal proceedings. It will also naturally – and sensibly – lead to a debate about who is morally
responsible for what occurred. If the parties involved are good and reasonable people, they
themselves will wonder if what happened was Btheir fault^. And so we need to reflect carefully
on, and try to reach agreement about, what people can and cannot be held morally and legally
responsible for when it comes to accidents involving self-driving cars. We also need to reflect
on, and try to reach agreement about, who can be held responsible for the things that might
happen and the harms and deaths that might occur in traffic involving these kinds of vehicles.
Questions concerning both Bforward-looking^ and Bbackward-looking^ responsibility arise
here. Forward-looking responsibility is the responsibility that people can have to try to shape
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what happens in the near or distant future in certain ways. Backward-looking responsibility is
the responsibility that people can have for what has happened in the past, either because of
what they have done or what they have allowed to happen. (Van de Poel 2011) Applied to risk-
management and the choice of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars, both kinds of
responsibility are highly relevant. One set of important questions here concerns moral and
legal responsibility for how cars that will be introduced into traffic are to be programmed to
deal with the various different kinds of risky situations they might encounter in traffic. Another
set of questions concerns who exactly should be held responsible, and for what exactly they
should be held responsible, if and when accidents occur. The former set of questions are about
forward-looking responsibility, the second about backward-looking responsibility. Both sets of
questions are crucial elements of the ethics of self-driving cars.10
We will not delve into how to answer these difficult questions about moral and legal
responsibility here. Our point in the present context is rather that these are pressing questions
we cannot ignore, but must instead necessarily grapple with when it comes to the ethics of
accident-algorithms for self-driving cars. Such questions concerning moral and legal respon-
sibility are typically simply set aside in discussions of the trolley problem. For some of the
theoretical purposes the trolley cases are meant to serve, it might be perfectly justifiable to do
so. In contrast, it is not justifiable to set aside basic questions of moral and legal responsibility
when we are dealing with accident-algorithms for self-driving cars. So we here have a second
very important disanalogy between these two topics.
5 Stipulated Facts and Certainties vs. Risks, Probabilities, and Uncertainties
We now turn to the third and last major disanalogy we wish to highlight. Here, too, we will
approach this disanalogy via a criticism that has been raised against the trolley problem and its
relevance to the ethical issues we face in the real world. What we have in mind is Sven Ove
Hansson’s criticism of standard moral theory and what he regards as its inability to properly
deal with the risks and uncertainties involved in many real world ethical issues. In one of his
recent papers on this general topic, Hansson specifically brings up the trolley problem as one
clear case in point of what he has in mind. Hansson writes:
The exclusion of risk-taking from consideration in most of moral theory can be clearly
seen from the deterministic assumptions commonly made in the standard type of life-or-
death examples that are used to explore the implications of moral theories. In the famous
trolley problem, you are assumed to know that if you flip the switch, then one person
will be killed, whereas if you don’t flip it, then five other persons will be killed.
(Hansson 2012, 44).
What is Hansson’s worry here? What is wrong with being asked to stipulate that we know
the facts and that there is no uncertainty as regards what will happen in the different sequences
of events we could initiate? Hansson comments on this aspect of the trolley cases in the
following way:
10 Current practice typically assigns backward-looking responsibility for accidents to drivers. But the introduc-
tion of self-driving cars is likely to shift backward-looking responsibility-attributions towards car-manufacturers.
If justified, this would make backward- and forward-looking responsibility for accidents more closely related and
coordinated. We owe these observations to an anonymous reviewer.
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This is in stark contrast to ethical quandaries in real life, where action problems with
human lives at stake seldom come with certain knowledge of the consequences of the
alternative courses of action. Instead, uncertainty about the consequences of one’s
actions is a major complicating factor in most real-life dilemmas. (Ibid.)
Hansson is not alone in making this criticism. Others have also worried that it is absurd to
suppose, in any realistic situation, that doing something such as to push a large person in front
of a trolley car would be sure to stop the trolley and save any people who might be on the
tracks. As before, however, this may not be a fatal objection to the trolley cases if we conceive
of them as a set of stylized thought experiments we use for certain circumscribed purely
theoretical and abstract purposes. But again, we also see here that the trolley cases are far
removed from the reality that we face when we turn to the ethical problem of how to program
self-driving cars to respond to risky situations when we introduce these cars into actual traffic
and thereby bring them into the real world with all its messiness and uncertainty.
We will illustrate this point by taking a closer look at our scenario from section I above.
This was the scenario in which a heavy truck suddenly appears in the path of a self-driving car
carrying five passengers, and in which the only way for the self-driving car to save the five
appeared to be to swerve to the right, where it would kill an elderly pedestrian on the sidewalk.
Under this brief description, the scenario might appear to involve an ethical dilemma in which
we need to choose between outcomes whose features are known with certainty. But once we
add more details, it becomes clear that there is bound to be a lot of uncertainty involved in a
more fully described and maximally realistic version of the case.
First, the self-driving car cannot acquire certain knowledge about the truck’s trajectory, its
speed at the time of collision, and its actual weight. This creates uncertainty because each of
these factors has a strong causal influence on the fatality risk for the passengers of the self-
driving car. (Berends 2009; Evans 2001) Moreover, the truck-driver might try to prevent the
accident by steering back to her lane. Or if it’s already too late, she might start braking just half a
second before the crash (thereby significantly reducing the truck’s speed and impact). The self-
driving car’s software can only work with estimates of these alternative courses of events.11
Second, focusing on the self-driving car itself, in order to calculate the optimal trajectory, the
self-driving car needs (among other things) to have perfect knowledge of the state of the road,
since any slipperiness of the road limits its maximal deceleration. But even very good data from
advanced sensors can only yield estimates of the road’s exact condition. Moreover, regarding
each of the five passengers: their chances of surviving the head-on collision with the truck
depends on many factors, for example their age, whether they are wearing seat belts, whether
they are drunk or not, and their overall state of health. (Evans 2008) The car’s technologymight
enable it to gather partial, but by no means full, information about these issues.12
Finally, if we turn to the elderly pedestrian, again we can easily identify a number of
sources of uncertainty. Using facial recognition software, the self-driving car can perhaps
estimate his age with some degree of precision and confidence. (Goodall 2014a) But it may
merely guess his actual state of health and overall physical robustness.13 And whereas
11 Furthermore, while the self-driving car may recognize the truck-type and know its empty mass, the truck may
carry a load whose weight is unknown to the self-driving car.
12 There is, of course, also the question of whether these kinds of facts about the passengers should count
ethically here and if so, how exactly? Cf. Lin 2015
13 It should be noted here that it is controversial whether we should assign any ethical weight to the fact that an
elderly person might have a lower chance of surviving an accident than a younger, less fragile person might have.
We are not taking a stand on that issue here.
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statistical fatality rates for car-pedestrian collisions apply to a whole population, these might
ultimately have fairly low predictive value for the elderly pedestrian’s more precise
chances of survival.14 Of course, in real life, the scenario also involves the possibility
that the pedestrian might avoid being hit by quickly stepping out of the self-driving
car’s path. The self-driving car necessarily has to work with an estimate of what the
pedestrian is likely to do. And this estimation may need to be based on simulation-experiments
rather than actual statistics.
As we start filling in these various further details, it quickly becomes clear that what we are
dealing with here are not outcomes whose features are known with certainty. We are rather
dealing with plenty of uncertainty and numerous more or less confident risk-assessments. (Cf.
Goodall 2014b, 96) This means that we need to approach the ethics of self-driving cars using a
type of moral reasoning we don’t have occasion or reason to use in thinking about the standard
cases discussed in the trolley problem literature.
In the former case, we need to engage in moral reasoning about risks and risk-management.
We also need to engage in moral reasoning about decisions under uncertainty. In contrast, the
moral reasoning that somebody facing a trolley case uses is not about risks and how to respond
to different risks. Nor is it about how to make decisions in the face of uncertainty. This is a
categorical difference between trolley-ethics and the ethics of accident-algorithms for self-
driving cars. Reasoning about risks and uncertainty is categorically different from reasoning
about known facts and certain outcomes. The key concepts used differ drastically in what
inferences they warrant. And what we pick out using these concepts are things within different
metaphysical categories, with differing modal status (e.g. risks of harm, on one side, versus
actual harms, on the other).15
Thus the distinctive and difficult ethical questions that risks and uncertainty give rise to are
not in play in the trolley cases. But they certainly are in the ethics of self-driving cars. Let us
give just one illustration. A significant number of people may find hitting the pedestrian
morally unacceptable if this was certain to kill him. (Cf. Thomson 2008) But what if the
estimated chance of a fatal collision were 10 %? Or just 1 %? To many people, imposing a 1 %
chance of death on an innocent pedestrian in order to save five car-passengers might appear to
be the morally right choice. The trolley cases don’t require any such judgments. In the
scenarios involved in the trolley cases, all outcomes are assumed to be a 100 % certain, and
hence there is no need to reflect on how to weigh different uncertain and/or risky outcomes
against each other.16
Yet again, in other words, we find that the two different issues differ in striking
and non-trivial ways. In one case, difficult questions concerning risks and uncertainty
immediately arise, whereas in the other, no such issues are involved. This is another
important disanalogy between the ethics of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars
and the trolley problem. It is a disanalogy that exposes a categorical difference between these
two different subjects.
14 Research on pedestrian fatality rates is still in progress. (Rosén et al. 2011)
15 Reasoning about risks and uncertainty is about what could happen even if it never does, whereas reasoning
about known facts is about what is actually the case.
16 When one is dealing with risks and uncertainty, one needs, among other things, to grapple with how to weigh
uncertainties and risks against actual benefits. One needs to confront the difficult question of why imposing a risk
onto somebody might be wrong, even if things go well in the end and certain kinds of actual harms end up not
being realized. These and other difficult questions don’t arise if, as is rarely the case, one knows exactly what will
happen in different scenarios we might instigate. (Hayenhjelm and Wolff 2012) For some discussion of the
acceptability of current driving risks, see (Smids 2015).
1286 S. Nyholm, J. Smids
6 Concluding Discussion
We have isolated a number of important differences between the ethics of accident-algorithms
for self-driving cars and the trolley problem. These all center around three main areas of
disanalogy: with respect to the overall decision-situation and its features, with respect to the
role of moral and legal responsibility, and with respect to the epistemic situation of the
decision-makers. The various points we have made can be summarized and shown with the
help of the following table. We here number the main areas of disanalogy as 1 through 3, and





1a: Decision faced by: Groups of individuals/
multiple stakeholders
One single individual
1b: Time-perspective: Prospective decision/
contingency planning
Immediate/Bhere and now^
1c: Numbers of considerations/
situational features that
may be taken into account:
Unlimited; unrestricted Restricted to a small number
of considerations; everything
else bracketed
2: Responsibility, moral and legal: Both need to be taken into account Both set aside; not taken
into account
3: Modality of knowledge,
or epistemic situation:
A mix of risk-estimation
and decision-making under uncertainty
Facts are stipulated to be
both certain and known
We started by asking just how similar, or dissimilar, the trolley problem and the
issue of how self-driving cars ought to be programmed are. Return now briefly to the
question of whether the literature on the trolley problem is a good, or perhaps the
best, place to turn to for input for the ethics of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars. We can
now argue as follows.
On the one hand, the key issues we have isolated as being of great importance for the ethics
of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars are typically not discussed in the main literature on
the trolley problem. For example, this literature is not about the risks or the legal and moral
responsibilities we face in traffic. On the other hand, the main issues that the literature on the
trolley problem does engage directly with have to do with rather different things than those we
have flagged as being most pressing for the ethics of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars.
As we noted above, this literature discusses things such as: the ethical differences
between positive and negative duties and killing and letting die, and psychological
and neuro-scientific theories about how different types of moral judgments are gen-
erated by our minds and brains. Taking these considerations together, we think it is clear that the
literature on the trolley problem is not the best, nor perhaps even a particularly good, place to
turn to for source materials and precedents directly useful for the ethics of accident-algorithms
for self-driving cars.
Return next to the positive aim of the paper, namely, to isolate and identify key issues that
the ethics of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars needs to deal with. Based on what we
have argued in the previous sections – as summarized in the table above – we wish to draw the
following broad conclusions about the general ethical issues that are raised by the question of
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how to program self-driving cars to respond to accident-scenarios. What we are facing here are
complex and difficult ethical issues relating to, among other things, the following:
(i) decision-making faced by groups and/or multiple stake-holders;
(ii) morally loaded prospective decision-making and/or contingency planning;
(iii) open-ended ethical reasoning taking wide ranges of considerations into account
(iv) ethical reasoning concerned with both backward-looking and forward-looking moral and
legal responsibility
(v) ethical reasoning about risks and/or decisions under uncertainty.
We add the qualifier Bamong other things^ here in order to make it clear that we are not of
the opinion that these are the only general topics that are relevant for the ethics of accident-
algorithms for self-driving cars. Rather, it is our view that these are among the general topics
that are most relevant for this specific issue, but that there are certainly also other general topics
that are highly relevant as we approach this ethical problem in a systematic way. Most
importantly, we need to identify the ethical values, considerations, and principles that are best
suited to be brought to bear on this pressing ethical issue. And we need to think about how to
specify and adapt those values, considerations, and principles to the particular problem of how
self-driving cars ought to be programmed to react to accident-scenarios. In other words, there
is a lot of work to do here.17
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